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THE ERA OF DEFERENCE: COURTS,
EXPERTISE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF
NEW DEAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Reuel E. Schiller*
The first two terms of Franklin Roosevelt's presidency (1933-1941)
were periods of great administrative innovation. Responding to the
Great Depression, Congress created scores of new administrative
agencies charged with overseeing economic policy and implement-
ing novel social welfare programs. The story of the constitutional
difficulties that some of these policy innovations encountered is a
staple of both New Deal historiography and the constitutional his-
tory of twentieth-century America. There has been very little
writing, however, about how courts and the New Deal-era adminis-
trative state interacted after these constitutional battles ended.
Having overcome constitutional hurdles, these administrative agen-
cies still had to interact with the judiciary in their day-to-day
operations. This Article examines this interaction. In particular, it
shows how Roosevelt's appointees to the federal bench changed
administrative law so as to dramatically diminish the role of the ju-
diciary in the administrative process. The New Dealers espoused
what I will call a "prescriptive" vision of policymaking in which
expert administrators implemented the policy desires that emerged
from the democratic process. There was little room for courts in this
vision of policymaking. This era of judicial passivity was short
lived, but it firmly defined the role of expertise in the administrative
state and created the model ofjudicial deference that would be both
emulated and reacted against as administrative law developed dur-
ing the rest of the twentieth century.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1904, the Ohio Valley Water Company ("Ohio Water") paid $3,900
for nine acres of property at the tip of Neville Island, a small sliver of land
in the middle of the Ohio River about four miles northwest of Pittsburgh.'
Two of the nine acres were dry land, and Ohio Water built a pumping station
there. The remaining seven acres were wetlands made up mostly of a sand-
bar where the company sank its wells. Having thus improved the land, Ohio
Water informed the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission ("PSC") that
the land was now worth no less than $100,000. According to the company,
drawing Ohio River water up through the sandbar purified the water, render-
ing it particularly potable. Ohio Water, therefore, possessed a unique and
valuable piece of land.
Ohio Water had to report the value of its land to the PSC because the
Commission needed this information to determine what rates Ohio Water
would be allowed to charge its customers. Rate-making was a tricky busi-
ness. Since the late 1890s, the Supreme Court of the United States had
required rate-making agencies to set rates at a level that would allow public
utilities to receive a reasonable return on their investment.2 Rates that did
not allow such a return were confiscatory and, as such, violated the Due
1. A detailed description of the facts surrounding the dispute between the Ohio Valley Wa-
ter Company and the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission can be found in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's opinion, Borough of Ben Avon v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 103 A. 744, 747-49 (Pa.
1918), rev'd, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
2. See e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361 (1898). For a contemporary, encyclopedic discus-
sion of rate-making and rates of return, see ROBERT P. REEDER, THE VALIDITY OF RATE
REGULATIONS (1914).
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, to determine whether a
particular rate was constitutional, a court had to determine whether it would
allow a company to receive "a just and reasonable return upon the fair
valuation of its property."3 Accordingly, the more a company's property was
worth, the more it could charge its customers.
Unfortunately for Ohio Water, the Pennsylvania PSC did not think the
Neville Island property was worth $100,000. Indeed, the Commissioners did
not think it was worth even half that much. According to the PSC, the reason
such tasty water flowed from Ohio Water's wells was not because of some
special property of the sandbar. The water was of high quality because the
company was not pumping Ohio River water at all. Its wells had gone down
through the sandbar into a slowly flowing aquifer that ran under the Ohio
River, known to geologists as the Wisconsin Glacial Flow (and to the resi-
dents of Pittsburgh as "The Fourth River").4 Since the flow could be
accessed along the Ohio River at least to the Ohio border and throughout
Neville Island, there was nothing particularly unique or valuable about the
sandbar. Lower value meant lower rates.
Facing such financial hardship, Ohio Water appealed the PSC's valua-
6tion to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which reversed the Commission.
After reviewing the evidence submitted to the PSC, the Superior Court or-
dered the agency to fix the company's rates based on the higher valuation of
the Neville Island property.7 The PSC, in turn, appealed the Superior Court's
decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
At issue in this appeal was not the substance of the debate over the value
of Ohio Water's wells. Instead, the litigants debated one of the most basic
issues confronting those who study the administrative state: what is the
proper relationship between courts and agencies?8 Indeed, it is the dispute
over this issue that makes this case, which ended up in the United States
Supreme Court in 1920 under the moniker Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben
3. Ben Avon, 103 A. at 747.
4. According to "Mr. Hice," the state geologist who testified before the PSC, the aquifer
produced water of "excellent quality." Id. For information about the Wisconsin Glacial Flow, see
Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh, The Point: The Underground River, http://www.clpgh.org/exhibit/
neighborhoods/point/pointn77.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
5. The dispute between the PSC and the Ohio Valley Water Company was not only about
the value of the wells on Neville Island. The company asserted that the PSC undervalued several
other aspects of the business: certain pipelines, the "going value" of the business, and the amount of
certain interest payments and brokerage fees. Ben Avon, 103 A. at 748-50.
6. Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 68 Pa. Super. 561, 593 (Super. Ct. 1917),
rev'd, 103 A. 744 (Pa. 1918), rev'd, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
7. Id. at 584.
8. See Ben Avon, 103 A. at 745-46 (discussing the principles governing the relationship
between courts and agencies).
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Avon Borough,9 such a good place to start an inquiry into the shifting rela-
tionship between the judiciary and the administrative state during the New
Deal.
Progressives and their New Deal-era descendents demanded that courts
stay out of the administrative process. Judges, they argued, did not possess
the expertise necessary to understand the issues that agencies had to address,
issues like the hydrological features of the Ohio River Valley. When courts
thrust themselves into the administrative process-as the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court did in this instance-they would, at best, make a hash of the
situation by applying legal doctrines rooted in otherworldly abstractions
while ignoring the practical necessities of the particular public policy at is-
sue. At worst, Progressives and New Dealers argued, courts would simply
impose outcomes on agencies favoring the vested interests that the adminis-
trative state was designed to tame. In an increasingly complex,
industrialized society, agencies had to be allowed to exercise their expertise
without judicial interference.
This was certainly the PSC's position, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court readily signed on. According to the court, determining the value of
property for the purpose of setting rates was a complex and technical pro-
cess "which calls for the exercise of a sound and reasonable judgment upon
a proper consideration of all relevant facts."' Because rate-making was "not
a matter of formulas," "[m]uch must be left to the sound discretion of the
appraising body, the tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience,
for the discharge of these delicate and complex duties."" An understanding
of the comparative expertise between a court and an agency was the key to
allocating power between the two:
It was assumed perhaps by the Legislature that the members of the Public
Service Commissions would acquire special knowledge of the matters in-
trusted [sic] to them by experience and study, and that ... they would
prove efficient instrumentalities for dealing with the complex problems
presented by the activities of these great corporations. It was not intended
that the courts should interfere with the commissions or review their de-
terminations further than is necessary to keep them within the law and
protect the constitutional rights of the corporations over which they were
given control. 2
Accordingly, courts were to be deferential when they reviewed agency
actions. Was the agency's action "reasonable" or "based on very substantial
9. 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
10. Ben Avon, 103 A. at 750.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 746 (quoting People ex rel. N.Y & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 113 N.E. 795, 796
(1916)).
[Vol. 106:399
HeinOnline -- 106 Mich. L. Rev. 402 2007-2008
The Era of Deference
evidence"? 3 Was its behavior "not arbitrary or capricious"? 4 Courts were
not to substitute their judgment for that of the agency. Because that had
clearly happened in this instance-the PSC's valuation of the Neville Island
property was "beyond question ... warranted," 5-the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court overturned the Superior Court's decision and reinstated the
PSC's valuation.
6
The PSC's victory, however, was short-lived. The company appealed the
Pennsylvania court's decision to the United States Supreme Court, which
tersely overturned the state court's opinion. Since an improper valuation of a
regulated company's property could result in a constitutional violation, "the
State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial
tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both
law and facts."'' 7 The Pennsylvania Superior Court had behaved properly,
independently reviewing the facts that had been submitted to the Public Ser-
vice Commission. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on the other hand, had
ignored its duty by deferentially reviewing the agency's action for mere rea-
sonableness. The expertise of the agency did not warrant any deference. 8
For progressive proponents of the administrative state, the Supreme
Court's ruling in Ben Avon was a nightmare come to life.' 9 Was the Court
really suggesting that courts not defer to agencies even on technical, factual
issues that could not possibly be within the expertise of the judiciary? How
could a court possibly justify second-guessing the state geologist of
Pennsylvania and several "[o]ther practical men, speaking from experience"
as to the ultimate source of the water that the Ohio Valley Water Company
pumped out of its wells on the sandbar of Neville Island?' ° Why have an
administrative state at all if courts were going to do all the work over again,
but badly? Or was that the point? Had courts become the agents of interests
who sought to undermine the efficiency and expertise of agencies in the
name of protecting their property rights and elite status?
Decided in 1920, Ben Avon was not a case generated by a New Deal-era
administrative innovation. However, the objections to Ben Avon took on a
new urgency with the advent of the Great Depression and the election of
13. Id. (quoting New York ex rel. N.Y & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 351
(1917)).
14. Id. (quoting McCall, 245 U.S. at 351).
15. Id. at 748.
16. Id. at 750.
17. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920).
18. Seeid. at291.
19. For negative reactions to Ben Avon, see the sources listed in FELIX FRANKFURTER & J.
FORRESTER DAVISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 464 n.7 (2d ed. 1935).
20. Ben Avon, 103 A. at 748.
December 20071
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Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt's landslide in 1932 brought with it a com-
mitment to administrative government on an unprecedented scale. Ben Avon
and its progeny represented an allocation of power between courts and the
administrative state completely inconsistent with the Roosevelt administra-
tion's strategy for combating the economic crisis.
The 1930s thus became a crucible for the reconceptualization and recon-
struction of this relationship between agencies and the judiciary. Forces
seeking to expand administrative autonomy clashed with those seeking to
ensure that agencies remained firmly under the control of courts. While this
clash was certainly political-generally speaking, it pitted supporters of the
New Deal against its opponents-it was also an intellectual conflict about
the role of expertise in modern government. A crisis of the Great Depres-
sion's magnitude gave policymakers with a commitment to expertise-based
administration a powerful weapon to dislodge the judiciary from its role
protecting property and economic liberty from administrative agencies.
Consequently, by the end of the 1930s there had been a dramatic change in
the relationship between courts and the administrative state. Courts were
placed in a position frankly subservient to the administrators whose task it
was to rationalize and reform the failing economy through the application of
scientific expertise.
This Article recounts the details of this narrative for two distinct histo-
riographical reasons. The first is to address a hole in the existing historical
literature of the New Deal. In the past ten years, there has been a marvelous
effervescence of legal-historical scholarship about the New Deal." The bulk
of this scholarship, however, has focused on constitutional law. This, in and
of itself, is not surprising. Constitutional law holds pride of place in the
popular and academic imagination. Additionally, one of the major legacies
of the New Deal was the redefinition of liberalism in a manner that shifted
its focus from economic liberties to other rights including freedom of ex-
pression, and the equal protection of ethnic, religious, and racial minorities.
It is an obvious impulse, therefore, to try to discern the law's role in this
process, which requires a thorough study of New Deal-era constitutional
law. Historians, however, have long acknowledged that the rise of the fed-
21. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 255-311 (1998);
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION (1998); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUAL-
ITY 98-289 (2004); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CON-
STITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000); Barry Friedman, The History of the Counter-Majoritarian
Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000); Laura Kalman, Law, Politics,
and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165 (1999); Colin Gordon, Rethinking the New Deal, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (1998).
[Vol. 106:399
HeinOnline -- 106 Mich. L. Rev. 404 2007-2008
December 2007] The Era of Deference
eral administrative state during the New Deal was another crucial and ar-
22guably preeminent component of the modem legal and political order. Why
then has there been so little work done on the invention and transformation
of administrative law during the New Deal?23
This obvious lacuna is made even more perplexing by the increasing
subtlety with which the administrative state itself is being examined. Schol-
arship produced under the rubric of "American political development" or
"historical institutionalism" has broadened the way in which the administra-
tive state has been portrayed. 24 In particular, scholars have demonstrated that
the emergence of the administrative state was not simply the process of po-
litical actors implementing the desires of their constituents for more state
control over the economic and social order. The nature of the emerging ad-
ministrative state was shaped by the way these political impulses were
refracted by existing institutional structures, both constitutional and bureau-
21cratic in nature. Scholars have examined how federalism, for example,
determined the way that policymakers implemented the political desire for
22. See. e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 3-4 (2002);
KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 271-77 (1989); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHO-
Doxy 193-246 (1992); WHITE, supra note 21, at 94.
23. There are some exceptions to this neglect. See HORWITZ, supra note 22; WHITE, supra
note 21; George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); Jessica Wang, Imagining the Administrative
State: Legal Pragmatism, Securities Regulation, and New Deal Liberalism, 17 J. POL'Y HIST. 257
(2005). None of these authors, however, discuss the doctrinal changes that are the subject of this
Article.
24. There has developed a vast bibliography regarding the so-called "new" political history.
For the basic premises, nicely outlined, see Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of
Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985).
Two germinal writings are STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE Ex-
PANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982), and J.E Nettl, The State as
a Conceptual Variable, 20 WORLD POL. 559 (1968). For a nice selection of articles written in the
new institutionalist mode, see FEDERAL SOCIAL POLICY: THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION (Donald T.
Critchlow & Ellis W. Hawley eds., 1988); THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988); and STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Sven Steinmo et al. eds., 1992). For book-length examples of this type of
scholarship, excellent monographs include BRIAN BALOGH, CHAIN REACTION: EXPERT DEBATE AND
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER, 1945-1975 (1991); DANIEL P.
CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY
INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001); and BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, FROM
THE OUTSIDE IN: WORLD WAR II AND THE AMERICAN STATE (1996). For various sympathetic cri-
tiques of institutionalism, see Daniel R. Ernst, Law and American Political Development, 1877-
1938, 26 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 205 (1998); Ira Katznelson, The State to the Rescue? Political Science
and History Reconnect, 59 SOC. RES. 719 (1992); and Reuel Schiller, "Saint George and the
Dragon": Courts and the Development of the Administrative State in Twentieth-Century America,
17 J. POL'Y HIST. 110 (2005).
25. SKOWRONEK, supra note 24, at 10-18; Nettl, supra note 24, at 564-66, 569-71:
Margaret Weir et al., Introduction: Understanding American Social Politics, in THE POLITICS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 24, at 3, 16-27.
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26social welfare programs, and how agencies generated certain political pres-
sures while insulating themselves from others2 7
Unfortunately, the one institution that these state-building scholars have ne-
glected is the judiciary. This fact motivates my second historiographical
purpose: There is a need to build a bridge between this institution-focused po-
litical history (which ignores courts) and the new legal history of the New Deal
(which ignores administrative law). This Article is a modest attempt to do so.
My thesis is simple. New Deal policymakers subscribed to what I will
call a prescriptive vision of how public policy should be made. Expert ad-
ministrators and a strong executive were best equipped to address a given
societal problem and efficiently implement a solution. The democratic proc-
ess identified social problems at the most general level. It was then the job
of experts to discern the best way to solve a particular problem and imple-
ment the appropriate policy. Inexpert, inflexible, rule-bound courts were to
recognize their proper role by allowing agencies to act with minimal judicial
interference. By 1940, the federal judiciary had accepted this prescriptive
model of policymaking and its reduced role in it.
My argument proceeds as follows: First, in Part I of this Article, I will
draw a simplified, thumbnail sketch of the relationship between courts and
agencies in the years before the New Deal. I will then, in Part II, discuss in
some detail the debate that took place during the 1930s about the proper role
of the courts in a polity that increasingly recognized the importance of admin-
istrative agencies for addressing the economic and social dislocations caused
by the Great Depression. In Part III of this Article, I will demonstrate how
administrative law changed during the 1930s to reflect the beliefs of those in
this debate who asserted that courts should play as small a role as possible in
the new, bureaucratic state. Finally, in Part IV, I will return to my two histo-
riographical points. The extreme judicial deference to administrative agencies
that marked the late 1930s and early 1940s was short-lived. But the story of its
emergence is an excellent example of the importance of understanding the
intersection between changes in administrative law and the development of
the administrative state. The intellectual and political currents that shaped ad-
ministrative law in the 1930s and 1940s defined the role that courts would
play in the administrative process. As such, they helped to channel the devel-
opment of bureaucracies and define the scope of their powers during the
immense burst of state building that was the New Deal.
26. See, e.g., Ann Shola Orloff, The Political Origins of America's Belated Welfare State, in
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 24, at 37.
27. CARPENTER, supra note 24, at 3-4, 15-18, 30-33, 363-67.
28. See Schiller, supra note 24. As John D. Skrentny has written, scholars have recently
begun to address this neglect. See John D. Skrentny, Law and the American State, 32 ANN. REV.
Soc. 213,220-28 (2006).
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BEFORE THE NEW DEAL: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Discovering the exact nature of the relationship between courts and
agencies in the years prior to the New Deal is a daunting task. There existed
no single statute that defined this relationship at either the federal or state
level. Instead, there was a hodge-podge of different statutes and common
law doctrines that could be used to challenge administrative actions. 9 Con-
temporary scholars including Ernst Freund, the pater familias of the
discipline we now call administrative law, recorded the use of a host of
common law doctrines to challenge agency actions: damage actions in tort
or contract; writs of mandamus, certiorari, quo warranto, prohibition, and
habeas corpus; as well as injunctions and declaratory judgments.0 Addition-
ally, the statutes that established administrative agencies frequently provided
for some form judicial review of final administrative action.3 Finally, as the
Ben Avon case illustrates, the Constitution itself sometimes required judicial
oversight of agencies.
As if this vast variety of methods of obtaining judicial review of admin-
istrative action were not confusing enough, different procedural mechanisms
dictated differing degrees of judicial oversight. In New York, for example,
certiorari review required courts to overturn agency actions if "findings of
fact [we]re not supported by competent proof or [we]re against the weight
of the evidence," while mandamus was required only if courts found agency
action to be "palpably illegal."32 In Massachusetts, writs of prohibition could
only be issued against an agency that had acted in "clear excess of jurisdic-
tion," while quo warranto actions generated de novo hearings before a court.33
Statutes requiring judicial review frequently stated that administrative action
had to be supported by "substantial evidence," though this standard meant
different things in different contexts. 34
29. E. Blythe Stason, Methods of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action, 24 A.B.A. J.
274 (1938).
30. ERNST FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 330-642 (2d ed. 1928); see also
KENNETH C. SEARS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1-205 (1938); E. BLYTHE
STASON, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 498-601 (1937).
31. For an encyclopedic list of such statutory language, see E. Blythe Stason, "Substantial
Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1026, 1027-28, nn.3-20 (1941).
32. 9 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM., PROBLEMS RELATING TO JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION 786-88 (1938).
33. SEARS, supra note 30, at 26 (quoting Kevorkian v. Judges of the Superior Court, 3
N.E.2d 742, 743 (Mass. 1936)); cf. Att'y Gen. v. Sullivan, 40 N.E. 843, 844 (Mass. 1895). For a
clear illustration of contrasting state systems of judicial review, including California's particularly
Byzantine common law system, see FERREL HEADY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LEGISLATION IN
THE STATES 98-118 (1952).
34. See Stason, supra note 31, at 1035-39.
December 20071
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Additionally, courts changed the intensity of their review of agency ac-
tion depending on what exactly the agency was doing. Review of factual
determinations might be less rigorous than review of legal determinations.
Review of the application of facts to legal standards might fall somewhere in
between.35 On the other hand, as Ben Avon illustrated, certain facts might be
reviewed de novo. Courts also drew a distinction between reviewing quasi-
36
judicial acts and quasi-legislative acts.
Despite these mind-numbing combinations (and the considerable sym-
pathy they evoke for the practitioners who had to deal with them), it is
possible to generalize about the way courts treated agency decisions. In sub-
ject matter areas that were clearly within traditional notions of the police
power, courts gave agencies considerable discretion. By the 1920s, courts
consistently deferred to agency actions with respect to public health,37 cus-
toms and postal regulations,3" the administration of veterans' pensions, 39 and
various licensing regimes.40 The same was true of the actions of taxing
agencies,a1 the Patent and Trademark Office, 2 the Federal Land Office, a3 and
the Bureau of Immigration. 44
On the other hand, for types of regulation that touched on subject matter
at the outer edge of the police power, judicial review was more exacting. As
Ben Avon demonstrated, the federal courts were happy to insert themselves
into the rate-making process. The main federal agency involved in rate-
making was the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"). Initially, the
judiciary was deeply hostile to this agency, limiting its jurisdiction and its
remedial powers, and reviewing its rate-makings with a fine-toothed comb.
By 1920, however, the courts and the ICC seem to have settled their differ-
35. See FREUND, supra note 30, at 714-19; E.F. Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Action by the Federal Supreme Court, 35 HARV. L. REV. 127, 149-51 (1921); Nathan Isaacs,
Judicial Review ofAdministrative Findings, 30 YALE L.J. 781, 781-83 (1921).
36. STASON, supra note 30, at 80-82; see also FREUND, supra note 30, at 1-46.
37. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1922).
38. Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of
the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 37-43 (2000).
39. Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S. 221, 225 (1924).
40. Schiller, supra note 38, at 43-51.
41. Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States,
277 U.S. 551 (1928); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Rd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
42. Postum Cereal Co. v. Cal. Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927).
43. Albertsworth, supra note 35, at 140-41.
44. Lucy E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 179-244 (1995).
45. ARI HOOGENBOOM & OLIVE HOOGENBOOM, A HISTORY OF THE ICC: FROM PANACEA TO
PALLIATIVE 32-38 (1976); SKOWRONEK, supra note 24, at 248-67.
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ences, and the judiciary placed itself in a considerably more deferential pos-
ture.
46
The federal judiciary did not, however, place itself in the same position
with respect to state rate-makers or other federal agencies. Not only did the
Supreme Court require lower courts to pick through the details of agency
valuations-as it did in Ben Avon-it also imposed particular techniques on
agencies for determining value, and even picked among competing eco-
nomic theories of what value was.47 At issue in these cases was not simply
the fact that the courts overturned many agency determinations, although
48they did. Instead, these cases illustrate that courts had no compunction
about second-guessing agencies on a host of issues that were clearly within
the agency's expertise: what formula was best for determining the rate of
return, what was a reasonable rate of return, and how much was a given
piece of property worth.
The judiciary's assertion of control over the Federal Trade Commission
was even more dramatic. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,
which created the FTC and gave it the power to define and prosecute unfair
46. For Supreme Court cases in this vein, see Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railway Co. v.
United States (The New England Division Case), 261 U.S. 184 (1923), and United States v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (The Intermountain Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 476 (1914).
See also HOOGENBOOM & HOOGENBOOM, supra note 45, at 97-98; 2 I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTER-
STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 384-393
(1931). Skowronek suggests that the judiciary's deferent attitude was the product of the emergence
of an "era of administrative justice" during the 1920s. SKOWRONEK, supra note 24, at 267. The
contrasting attitude of the federal courts to state rate-makers and other federal agencies, such as the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), suggests that this explanation is incorrect. Robert Rabin ar-
gues, more plausibly, that the federal courts simply took a more deferential posture because they did
not have the institutional resources to review all of the ICC's work. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regu-
lation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1233-36 (1986). Finally, scholars of
agency capture, most famously Gabriel Kolko, might suggest that the ICC was so thoroughly con-
trolled by the industries it was supposed to regulate that they did not need courts to check the
agency's power. Indeed, Kolko argues that when the Supreme Court weakened the ICC in the late
1800s it "did enormous damage" to the interests of the railroads. GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND
REGULATION, 1877-1916, at 80-83 (1965).
47. Even a brief perusal of contemporary articles and notes demonstrates the detail that the
Court went into when reviewing the methods that agencies used when valuing property. See, e.g.,
Irston R. Barnes, Federal Courts and State Regulation of Utility Rates, 43 YALE L.J. 417 (1934);
Edwin C. Goddard, The Evolution and Devolution of Public Utility Law, 32 MICH. L. REv. 577
(1934); Willard John Stone, Jr., Comment, 34 MICH. L. REV. 100 (1935); Note, West v. Chesapeake
& Potomac Telephone Co.: The Index Method of Rate Valuation in the Supreme Court, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 297 (1935). For an excellent review of the controversy within the Supreme Court and among
professional economists as to how value should be defined for the purposes of rate-making, see
Stephan A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad
and Utility Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984).
48. Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881,
908-18 (2005); Michael J. Philips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process
Effective, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1069-72 (1997).
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trade practices, allowed for judicial review of agency decisions.49 Agency
findings of fact were to be "conclusive" if "supported by testimony."50 In
practice, however, the courts showed no deference to the agency at all. The
Supreme Court explicitly stated that courts, not the Commission, were to
define unfair trade practices.5 Furthermore, even the specific factual find-
ings of the agency were largely ignored by courts, prompting the leading
scholar of the agency to write in 1924 that "a search of the opinions of Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme Court does not reveal a single
case" where "the findings of the Commission have in any way affected the
decision of the court. 52 "[T]he Commission," he continued, "has become
little more than a subordinate adjunct of the judicial system." 3
Right on the eve of the New Deal, in February of 1932, the United States
Supreme Court gave the proponents of prescriptive government further
cause for worry. In Crowell v. Benson, the Court applied the principles of
Ben Avon to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, a federal statute
that created a system of worker's compensation for injuries on the nation's
54navigable waters. Benson claimed, among other things, that the Act was
unconstitutional if it was not read to allow a de novo determination of facts
by the federal district court that reviewed the findings of the agency that
administered the statute.55 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes
spoke of the importance of judicial deference to administrative fact find-
16ing. However, when it came to finding the most important "fundamental or
'jurisdictional' , facts, the federal courts retained their full measure of fact-
finding authority.58 The fundamental or jurisdictional facts in a workers'
compensation case were whether there existed an employer-employee rela-
tionship in the case at issue and, for a federal compensation commission,
whether the injury took place on navigable waters.59 Thus, a federal court
retained the ability to review these facts-the main facts in a case under the
Act-de novo. Any other holding would "sap the judicial power as it exists
49. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719-20 (1914).
50. Id. at 720.
51. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421,427 (1920).
52. GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 336 (1924).
53. Id. at 102.
54. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
55. See id. at 36.
56. See id. at 46-47.
57. Id. at 54.
58. Id. at 56-57, 60-61.
59. Id. at 54-55.
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under the Federal Constitution, and ... establish a government of a bureau-
cratic character alien to our system. ' 6°
Crowell v. Benson became something of a bete noire for the proponents
of prescriptive government. Writing in 1932, John Dickinson, who went on
to be assistant secretary of commerce and head of the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division in the Roosevelt administration,6' laid out a parade of hor-
ribles:
[I]t seems clear that substantially all issues of importance committed to the
decision of administrative tribunals and which affect personal or property
rights are ... capable of being translated into issues of constitutional
fact.... [T]he result would be to subject all [such] administrative determi-
nations ... to a retrial on new evidence in the reviewing court.62
The effect of Crowell, if read broadly, could thus be "nothing short of a
revolution not merely in the precedents, but in the organization ... of the
whole existing administrative system of police regulation, state as well as
federal., 63 This would be a death blow to prescriptive government, which
required judicial passivity in the face of a robust administrative state. In-
stead, Crowell would dictate that "all state procedure under the police power
which does not provide an opportunity for [judicial] re-examination must be
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment." 64
Felix Frankfurter agreed. As he wrote in a typically melodramatic letter
to Justice Stone shortly after Crowell was decided,
I am again in mourning. Indeed[,] ... Crowell v. Benson make[s] me won-
der whether law is really my beat .... Before I had read the opinion I
could hardly have believed that disciplined legal minds would reach the
conclusions which the majority reached. That the Chief should have ...
determined the result in Crowell v. Benson[] confronts one with the neces-
sity of saying to oneself, "Either his mode of legal reasoning or mine is
without warrant." Truly, but for the dissents ... , I should feel that I had no
business to spend my life in public law, since my own understanding of
those matters is so different from that of the Court.'
60. Id. at 57.
61. IRONS, supra note 21, at 12; George L. Haskins, John Dickinson, 1894-1952, 101 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1952).
62. John Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of
Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. PA. L. REV. 1055, 1078-79 (1932).
63. Id. at 1079.
64. Id.
65. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fisk Stone (Feb. 29, 1932) (on file in Box 13 of
the Harlan Fisk Stone Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Collection). Gary Rowe brought this
letter to my attention by showing me an excerpt from it in Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the
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According to Frankfurter, the Court's decision in Crowell v. Benson repre-
sented the antithesis of what the proper relationship between courts and the
administrative state should be:
As to Crowell v. Benson, it is really too bad. The result seems to me the
evil offspring of the Jensen and the Ben Avon cases. It is the result of a
very jejune, unreal conception of administrative law. To make the issue of
employment more jurisdictional than any other fact upon which liability
depends is to turn these matters into a game much more sterile than the
speculations of the Schoolmen. 66
For future New Dealers, Crowell v. Benson was thus an awful specter,
haunting their dream of expert-driven, prescriptive policymaking. Many
New Deal statutory innovations would involve agency adjudications that
required the finding of facts relevant to a given agency's jurisdiction and the
constitutionality of that agency's actions.67 Thus, like Ben Avon, Crowell
would have to be exorcised before the administrative state could address the
61needs of society unhindered by the inexpert ministrations of the courts.
Consequently, as Franklin Roosevelt ascended to the presidency in 1933, a
number of thinkers both within his administration and outside of it began to
articulate a theory of administrative law that would define the proper rela-
tionship between courts and agencies in an activist, prescriptive state.
Roosevelt would draw on this theory as the federal government attempted to
rescue America from the Great Depression.
Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765,
775 (1986). Dan Ernst was kind enough to provide me with a copy of the entire letter.
66. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fisk Stone, supra note 65. The Jensen case that
Frankfurter refers to is Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). In Jensen, the court
held that the United States Constitution prohibited a state workers' compensation statute from ap-
plying to an injury inflicted upon a longshoreman while he was unloading cargo from an ocean-
going ship. Id. at 217. The Court reasoned that the state's assertion of jurisdiction violated both the
Commerce Clause and Article I1, Section 2 that vests admiralty jurisdiction in the federal courts. Id.
at 214-15, 217. Justice Holmes's dissent in Jensen is the source of one of his most famous bon
mots: "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some
sovereign...." Id. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
67. Consider, for example, the staples of the so-called first New Deal, the National Recovery
Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, both of which had the power to
punish businesses that violated wage, price, or production guidelines. See ANTHONY J. BADGER,
THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION YEARS, 1933-1940, at 87, 152 (1989). Other New Deal agencies
more traditionally associated with the second New Deal, such as the National Labor Relations
Board or the Security and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), had similar powers. Id. at 134-46;
THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 192-203 (1984). Of course, despite its rejection
of associationalism and, for the most part, business self-regulation, the SEC was actually a product
of early days of the New Deal. McCRAw, supra, at 168-81.
68. For other critiques of Crowell, see WALTER GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES
AND COMMENTS 944 n.9 (1940).
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I1. NEW DEAL ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND ITS DISSENTERS
The theory of New Deal administrative law was not formulated in a vac-
uum. Instead, it emerged from a political and philosophical debate between
two groups of policymakers and politicians. New Dealers sought to expand
the reach of the administrative state and curtail the role of the courts. Their
opponents portrayed these actions as threats to constitutional government
and attacks on individual liberties. At worst, they were the first steps to-
wards totalitarianism. Supporters of the Roosevelt administration viewed
these claims as absurd-mere scare tactics employed by reactionary elites.
In the short run, the New Dealers won this debate. Contemporary political
culture was not sympathetic to those who endorsed the status quo. The eco-
nomic crisis of the 1930s demanded that the government take action. In such
a context, the proponents of prescriptive government were able to establish a
theoretical foundation for an administrative law regime that pushed courts to
the margins of the administrative process.
A. Expertise and the New Deal
The notion that expertise should be used to formulate public policy was
hardly an invention of the New Deal. Indeed, Progressive reformers of the
1910s and 1920s proffered expertise as the solution to a host of problems
disturbing the social order at the beginning of the twentieth century. They
believed that the scientific method could be applied to these problems. 69
Technocratic experts, having arrived at a solution to a given problem, should
be allowed to implement it.7° Central to this faith in expertise was the idea
that administrative experts needed the flexibility to shape governmental re-
sponses to individual problems. Static laws had to be replaced by adjustable,
context-specific guidelines. Accordingly, courts would have to take a back-
seat to expert administrative agencies.7'
An economic crisis of the magnitude of the Great Depression only
heightened these demands for prescriptive government. Potential solutions
ranged from marginal tinkering with the free market-voluntary planning
councils, for example-to wholesale transformations of the political and
69. See JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRES-
SIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920, at 270, 385 (1986); ROBERT H. WIEBE,
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 150 (3d prtg. 1968); Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Pro-
gressivism, 10 REVIEWS AM. HIsT. 113, 126-27 (1982); Dorothy Ross, Modernist Social Science in
the Land of the New/Old, in MODERNIST IMPULSES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES, 1870-1930, at 171,
187-88 (Dorothy Ross ed., 1994).
70. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 224; KLOPPENBERG, supra note 69, at 385; WIEBE
supra note 69, at 160.
71. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 222-25; KLOPPENBERG, supra note 69, at 270-71,
385, 391; WIEBE, supra note 69, at 145, 150, 160-63; Rodgers, supra note 69, at 126-27.
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economic structure of the United States. What all these remedies had in
common, however, was an emphasis on prescriptive government. More
planning-be it by an industry group, an administrative agency, or a fascist
dictator-was necessary. To many intellectuals and policymakers, the De-
71pression proved that laissez-faire capitalism was a failure. Only some
degree of centralized planning could control what the New Dealers saw as
the socially destructive tendencies of free market capitalism.74
This prescriptive conception of government filtered into legal scholars'
beliefs about the role the judiciary should play in the policymaking process.
Legal thinkers of the 1930s-their thought forged in the fires of Franklin
Roosevelt's battle with the Supreme Court over the constitutionality of
many pieces of New Deal legislation-rejected any role for the courts in the
policymaking process.75 Judges were, at best, inexpert meddlers in prescrip-
tive government and, at worst, a reactionary force struggling to preserve
laissez-faire capitalism in the face of obvious obsolescence. Accordingly,
the vision of the judiciary that went with the prescriptive state was a pro-
foundly minimalist one.
One does not have to venture very far in an exploration of the prevailing
conceptions of the proper role of the state in the New Deal before encoun-
tering an historiographical obstacle. Some historians of the Roosevelt
administration have postulated the existence of two New Deals: a corpora-
tist, cooperative New Deal typified by the National Industrial Recovery Act
and advocated by Raymond Moley, Rex Tugwell, and Adolph Berle-the
so-called "Brain Trust"-and a trust-busting, class-conscious New Deal of
Felix Frankfurter and his "happy hot dogs," Tommy Corcoran, James
Landis, and Ben Cohen, embodied in the National Labor Relations Act.
76
Beliefs about the proper role of the state in policymaking, however, were
72. In this Article I will only discuss a small subset of the literature. For examples of exper-
tise-based solutions to the Great Depression that range from mildly statist to frankly totalitarian, see
the sources quoted in Reuel E. Schiller, Policy Ideals and Judicial Action: Expertise, Group Plural-
ism, and Participatory Democracy in Intellectual Thought and Legal Decision-Making, 1932-1970,
at 51-65 (May 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author).
73. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 108-118 and accompanying text.
76. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., first canonized the idea of the two New Deals in his three-volume
history of the Roosevelt administration. I ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT:
THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER (1956); 2 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT:
THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL (1958); 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL (1960). The idea that there was a split in the policymaking
philosophy had been stated earlier by a participant from each of the two alleged New Deals.
RAYMOND MOLEY, AFrER SEVEN YEARS (1939); RAYMOND MOLEY WITH ELLIOT A. ROSEN, THE
FIRST NEW DEAL (1966); cf. JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 54 (1975)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Corcovan & Ben Cohen to Felix Frankfurter (June 18, 1934));
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 149-51 (1963).
[Vol. 106:399
HeinOnline -- 106 Mich. L. Rev. 414 2007-2008
The Era of Deference
consistent across both "New Deals," if two are thought to exist.77 New
Dealers from 1933 to 1939, from Rex Tugwell to James Landis, envi-
sioned the government as a profoundly prescriptive entity. Experts would
formulate policy, agencies would implement it, and courts would stay out
of the way.
The Roosevelt administration's vision of policymaking was based on
three premises. First, the Depression proved that laissez-faire capitalism no
longer worked in the United States. Second, there were objectively correct
solutions to the Depression that could be arrived at through expert investiga-
tion. Third, these solutions, which would replace discredited laissez-faire
capitalism, would entail a concentration of planning power in the federal
government. The government was to become a prescriptive entity, managing
the economy through incentives and direct control.
The Great Depression profoundly shook intellectuals' faith in unregu-
lated capitalism. As Rex Tugwell, one of Roosevelt's inner circle of
advisors, wrote, the Depression sent a distinct message: "The jig is up.
The cat is out of the bag. There is no invisible hand. There never was. If
the depression has not taught us that, we are incapable of education. 'T
Unfettered capitalism had revealed itself to be destructive. Not only did it
result in "shoddy" goods and "adulterated" food, but the Depression dem-
onstrated that free market enterprises were not even able to keep their own
houses in order.79 Tugwell argued that rather than passing along their profits
to workers through higher wages, corporations speculated, overexpanded, or
hoarded their profits in massive, unutilized reserve pools. 8° Felix Frankfurter
concurred: "We have been assuming a continuing validity for the economic
theories of pioneer America while fact has been steadily undermining the-
ory.' 8 ' He went on to define the problems of contemporary capitalism:
"poverty amidst plenty" and technological innovation without "wider
77. If the bifurcated New Deal has not met its demise it has certainly come under attack. See
BADGER, supra note 67, at 94-108; ELLIOT A. ROSEN, HOOVER, ROOSEVELT AND THE BRAINS
TRUST: FROM DEPRESSION TO NEW DEAL 115-23 (1977); Otis L. Graham, Jr., Historians and the
New Deals: 1944-1960, 54 Soc. STUD. 133, 133-40 (1963). Alan Brinkley considers both the cor-
poratist initiatives of the early 1930s and the regulatory and antimonopoly initiatives of the mid-
19 30s to be the product of the same reform-liberal influences. ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF
REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 4-6 (1995). The change in the nature of
the New Deal, he argues, came after 1938 when liberalism dropped its critique of capitalism and
replaced it with a commitment to Keynesian economics and individual liberties. Id. at 6-8, 266-68.
78. REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY 14 (1935).
79. See REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL
ARTS 195 (1933).
80. For Tugwell's beliefs about the causes of the Depression, see TUOWELL, supra note 78,
at 187-92. See also BERNARD STERNSHER, REXFORD TUGWELL AND THE NEW DEAL 11-25 (1964).
81. FELIX FRANKFURTER, What We Confront in American Life (1933), reprinted in LAW AND
POLITICS 334, 336 (Archibald MacLeish & E.E Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939).
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diffusion of purchasing power.'' 2 In the face of these facts, he asked, "Do I
not report accurately ... a growing disbelief in the fairness of our capitalis-
tic scheme and even in its capacity to achieve its purposes?"83 Indeed,
laissez-faire was considered so obsolete by the 1930s that James Landis
wrote merely of its "remnants." 84
The most notable, and scholarly, example of administration intellectuals
interring laissez-faire was Adolph Berle and Gardner Means's 1933 book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property.5 Berle, a Columbia law
professor and member of Roosevelt's Brain Trust, and Means, an economics
professor also at Columbia, spent the vast majority of The Modern Corpora-
tion demonstrating that a large portion of American capital had moved from
individual ownership into publicly financed corporations. As this occurred,
Berle and Means argued, ownership of these corporations became so diffuse
that corporate management began to exercise complete control over a vast
816majority of American capital . Berle and Means then detailed the legal
methods by which this divergence between ownership and control was pre-
87
served. Because ownership and management had been separated, the
incentives that drove capitalism in the past-profits, competition, individual
88
initiative-were no longer applicable. The result was that competition no
longer regulated the market:
82. Id. at 336-37.
83. Id. at 339.
84. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10 (1938). Landis explained: "[A]s
the demands for positive solutions increased and, in the form of legislative measures, were precipi-
tated upon the cathodes of governmental activity, laissez faire-the simple belief that only good
could come by giving economic forces free play-came to an end." Id. at 8.
85. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed., Harcourt, Brace & World 1968) (1932). When it was published in 1932, The
Modem Corporation made a huge splash. Reviewing it in the New York Herald Tribune, Charles
Beard proclaimed it to be the most important book on "American statecraft" since "the immortal
Federalist." Charles Beard, Who Owns-and Who Runs the Corporations?, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb.
19, 1933, § 10, at 1. Stuart Chase, writing in the New Republic, declared it to be "epoch shattering."
Stuart Chase, licker Tapeworms, 73 NEW REPUBLIC 279, 299 (1933). The Yale Law Journal fawn-
ingly reviewed the book not once, but three times. Jerome Frank, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 989
(1933); Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 463 (1933); Norman L. Meyers, Book Review,
42 YALE L.J. 997 (1933). In one of these reviews, Jerome Frank wrote that The Modem Corporation
ranked with "Wealth of Nations as the first detailed description in admirably clear terms of the exis-
tence of a new economic epoch." Frank, supra, at 989. For a nuanced interpretation of The Modern
Corporation, see Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century
American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179 (2005).
86. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 85, at 66 ("Ownership of wealth without appreciable con-
trol and control of wealth without appreciable ownership appear to be the logical outcome of
corporate development.").
87. Id. at 127-288.
88. Id. at 9 ("The explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption
that the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective use.").
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Today competition in markets dominated by a few great enterprises has
come to be more often either cut-throat and destructive or so inactive as to
make monopoly or duopoly conditions prevail. Competition between a
small number of units each involving an organization so complex that costs
have become indeterminate does not satisfy the condition assumed by ear-
lier economists, nor does it appear likely to be as effective a regulator of
industry and of profits as they had assumed."'
Laissez-faire capitalism, Berle and Means argued, was dead, its principles
inapplicable to the economic institutions of the 1930s.
Having identified mindless obeisance to outdated notions of capitalism
as the problem behind the Depression, intellectuals within the Roosevelt
administration set about devising solutions. They began this search with a
conviction that these solutions could best be arrived at through expert ex-
amination of the problem. Raymond Moley, the third member of the Brain
Trust, wrote to Roosevelt in 1932 that "reasoned planning and expert per-
suasion" were at the heart of solving the country's crisis.9° This theme of
expertise permeated the thought of intellectuals within the administration. It
was usually coupled with the idea that there was an objectively correct solu-
tion to the country's problems. "[A]s knowledge increases and ultimate
common interest becomes manifest, rules of fair play are made," wrote
Henry Wallace in New Frontiers, his 1934 ode to expert planning in agricul-
ture.9' Tugwell was also convinced that expert planners, plucked from
universities and placed in Washington, would be the country's saviors: "The
university is a place for learning and for renewal. It is the source on which
government must depend for inspiration, for criticism, for expert service; the
source, also, of that political economy out of which the new industrial state
must be forged."92
Frankfurter and Landis echoed these sentiments. Frankfurter wrote re-
peatedly and with great admiration of expertise in the British civil service. 93
"Rulers," he believed, must be "educated for the tasks of government."
94
Government was simply too complicated to be left to well-intentioned ama-
89. Id. at 308.
90. ROSEN, supra note 77, at 147 (quoting Memorandum from Raymond Moley to Franklin
Roosevelt (May 19, 1932)).
91. HENRY A. WALLACE, NEW FRONTIERS 285 (1934).
92. TUGWELL, supra note 78, at 96; see also TUGWELL, supra note 79, at 91-108, 218-19
(noting the benefits of experts and the need for industry-specific knowledge within government); cf
WALLACE, supra note 91, at 42-43 (critiquing the private sector's control over Washington, which
stifles change).
93. Felix Frankfurter, Two Young Men Go to Washington (1936), reprinted in LAW AND
POLITICS, supra note 81, at 241-43; FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 139-
44 (1930) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT].
94. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT, supra note 93, at 133.
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teurs: "Compelled to grapple with a world more and more dominated by
technological forces, government must have at its disposal the resources of
training and capacity equipped to understand and deal with the complicated
issues to which these technological forces give rise.'9s Indeed, government
without expertise was a recipe for demagoguery. Only "quiet, detached"
experts could separate "facts from fiction" and determine "what [was] proof
and what surmise." 96 This process would generate a politics designed "to
reach the mind rather than to exploit feeling." 97 Similarly, Landis saw expert
administration as the only possible way for government to regulate the mod-
em economy effectively:
With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant; for
the art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its op-
eration, ability to shift requirements as the condition of the industry may
dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures upon the appearance of an emer-




New Deal intellectuals' emphasis on the importance of experts implied a
need for a prescriptive form of government in which these experts dictated
the proper policies to be implemented by the state. When these same think-
ers turned their attention to the actual implementation of policy, this
implication became explicit. The Depression could only be overcome
through a concentration of planning power. "[C]oncentration of responsibil-
ity in a modem society," Tugwell wrote in the New York Times Magazine, "is
indispensable." 99 The president must have powers "comparable to that of a
trusted private executive."' ° Landis devoted his book, The Administrative
Process, to promoting the concentration of power in administrative agen-
cies: "In the grant to [an administrative agency] of that full ambit of
authority necessary for it in order to plan, to promote, and to police, it pre-
sents an assemblage of rights normally exercisable by government as a
whole"' 0'
Programmatically, this call for a concentration of authority meant in-
creased governmental control of the American economy. Since the new
corporate form was not conducive to efficient use of American capital, Berle
and Means suggested that "the 'control' of the great corporations ...
95. Id. at 151.
96. Id. at 153.
97. Id.
98. LANDIS, supra note 84, at 23-24; see also id. at 26, 28.
99. Rexford G. Tugwell, The Ideas Behind the New Deal, N.Y TIMEs MAG., July 16, 1933, at 1.
100. Id. at 17.
101. LANDIS, supra note 84, at 15.
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develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by
various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the in-
come stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity."'0'
Moley called for the government to force industry to distribute its surplus
capital. '° 3 Tugwell, the most messianic of the Brain Trust, called for a vast
variety of government controls of industry, including public control of
prices and the allocation of capital. 'cWallace cast the government in a simi-
lar role in agricultural planning. 5 Landis and the Frankfurter prot6g6s,
Cohen and Corcoran, involved themselves in equally prescriptive, if less
grandiose endeavors. Landis set up the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and all three men drafted most of the New Deal's legislation regulating
public utilities and the securities markets.' The late thirties also saw the
passage of legislation mandating centralized planning of the coal and oil
industries and allowing continued self-regulation of small business even
after the collapse of the National Recovery Administration.'0 7
B. Expertise and the Courts
The concept of expertise also loomed large in New Deal-era thinking
about the role of the judiciary in the prescriptive state. Legal thinkers fo-
cused on the relationship between courts and the primary institutional
manifestation of prescriptive government, the administrative agency. Courts,
these thinkers believed, should stay out of the administrative process as
much as possible because they did not possess the specialized knowledge
necessary to second-guess expert administrators. Courts applied general
rules that were inappropriate for the practical nature of the administrative
state. According to Frankfurter, requiring judicial review of administrative
acts took judges out of their proper element and involved them in "matters
of fact and opinion not peculiarly within the special competence of
judges."'0 8 Since judges were not experts in a particular field, they lapsed
into inappropriate factual analysis wben they reviewed administrative opin-
ions. They "tortured" individual fact patterns "into universal molds which
102. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 85, at 312-13.
103. ROSEN, supra note 77, at 140-43.
104. TUGWELL, supra note 79, at 189-219.
105. WALLACE, supra note 91, at 19-27, 225-68.
106. BADGER, supra note 67, at 99-102; BRINKLEY, supra note 77, at 48-64; MCCRAW, supra
note 67, at 168-209.
107. BADGER, supra note 67, at 97.
108. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT, supra note 93, at 50-51 (discussing
judicial review of "social-economic legislation of the states" which, like review of administrative
action, often pitted judicial inflexibility against governmental experimentation).
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do not fit the infinite variety of life."' 9 Prescriptive administration was "law
in the making."" Its effectiveness would be crippled if courts imposed a
"premature synthesis[] of sterile generalization unnourished by the realities
of 'law in action.""
The boldest call for judicial passivity in the face of administrative exper-
tise was made by Landis in The Administrative Process. Landis envisioned
the conflict between administrative agencies and courts in heroic terms. It
was a titanic battle between "St. George" (agencies, "eternally refreshing
[their] vigor from the stream of democratic desires") and the dragon (courts,
"majestically girding [themselves] with the wisdom of the ages")."2 As if his
choice of allegory did not tip his hand enough, Landis explicitly called for a
recognition of the primacy of administrative agencies in the governmental
process. Courts simply did not have the expertise required to judge the ac-
tions of administrative experts. General legal principles were not appropriate
for the adjudication of the disputes that arose in a modern economy. Instead,
these disputes required "pragmatic" solutions based on "practical," contex-
tual judgments."' Because courts were not equipped to make such
judgments, "areas of government formerly within their control have been
handed over to administrative agencies for supervision.""4 This was entirely
appropriate, wrote Landis. In the prescriptive state, experts made policy de-
cisions. Review of these decisions should be minimal:
The power of judicial review under our traditions of government lies with
the courts because of a deep belief that the heritage they hold makes them
experts in the synthesis of design. Such difficulties as have arisen have
come because courts cast aside that role to assume to themselves expert-
ness in matters of industrial health, utility engineering, railroad
management, even bread baking." 5
109. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law,(1927), reprinted in LAW AND POLI-
TICS, supra note 81, at 236.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. LANDIS, supra note 84, at 123.
113. Id. at 33. Landis stated,
[Tlhere are certain fields where the making of law springs less from generalizations and prin-
ciples drawn from the majestic authority of textbooks and cases, than from a 'practical'
judgment which is based upon all the available considerations and which has in mind the most
desirable and pragmatic method of solving that particular problem.
Id.
114. id. at 123.
115. Id. at 154-55. For other assertions of administrative primacy based on expertise, see J.F.
Davidson, Administration and Judicial Self-Limitation, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV 291 (1936); Charles
Grove Haines, Effects of the Growth of Administrative Law upon Traditional Anglo-American Legal
[Vol. 106:399
HeinOnline -- 106 Mich. L. Rev. 420 2007-2008
The Era of Deference
Considering Landis's logic, it is not surprising that he recommended
minimal judicial review of administrative action. Issues of fact determined
by an agency would be unreviewable.1 6 Landis also suggested that issues of
law not be reviewed by a court unless the issue fell within the expertise of
the judiciary rather than that of the administrative agency; that is, unless it
was a question "that lawyers are equipped to decide."' 7 Though he did not
provide any examples that sprang from this rather tautological definition, he
strongly implied that most legal definitions within regulatory statutes (for
example, "unfair methods of competition" in trade regulation or "manipulat-
ive, deceptive or fraudulent" practice in securities regulation) should be
outside the courts' reach.
'8
C. The Conservative Response
These calls for judicial passivity in the face of an increasingly powerful
administrative state did not go unanswered. As Congress and the Roosevelt
administration extended the powers of the federal government to a larger
portion of the American economy than ever before, people who objected to
the substance of the New Deal agencies began objecting to the procedures
they used as well. Leading this attack was the American Bar Association. In
May of 1933, the ABA created the Special Committee on Administrative
Law ("Special Committee"), which was to examine the field and propose
appropriate legislation." 9 Over the next six years, the Special Committee
issued annual reports that were highly critical of the expertise-based ration-
ale for the administrative state.12 The "administrative absolutism" wrought
by the New Deal, the Special Committee claimed, was dragging the United
States down the road towards totalitarianism. Expertise was analogizedunfavorably to various forms of English despotism:
Theories and Practices, 26 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 875 (1932); and Marvin B. Rosenberry, Administra-
tive Law and the Constitution, 23 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 32 (1929).
116. See LANDIS, supra note 84, at 140-43.
117. Id. at 152.
118. Id. at 146-51.
119. On the history of the Special Committee, see Walter Gellhom, The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219, 219-23 (1986), and O.R. McGuire, The American
Bar Association's Administrative Law Bill, I LA. L. REV. 550, 550-52 (1939). See also George B.
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1569-75 (1996).
120. See, e.g., O.R. McGuire, Federal Administrative Action and Judicial Review, 22 A.B.A.
J. 492 (1936) [hereinafter McGuire, Federal Administrative Action and Judicial Review]; O.R.
McGuire, Proposed Reforms in Judicial Reviews of Federal Administrative Action, 19 A.B.A. J. 471
(1933).
121. Roscoe Pound used the phase "administrative absolutism" when he chaired the Special
Committee. See infra at note 126.
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We recall King John, the epitome of administrative justice perverted to
selfish ends, faced by the barons on the field of Runnymede-later the
King against Parliament-the courts of equity, representing the King's
conscience, against the courts of justice-and the King against colonists
who were to lay down their lives to establish the principle of representative
government. 1
Similarly, the decay of the notion of a strict separation of powers was
seen as a portent of authoritarian rule. As O.R. McGuire-the chairman of
the Special Committee from 1933 to 1937 and again in 1939-wrote,
"Should our present tri-partite system continue to weaken, we are faced with
the only possible alternatives of anarchy or the introduction of the final
phase of Utopianism, a form of government on the Russian, Italian or
German models-and let no one tell you the contrary."'
24
The 1938 Annual Report of the Special Committee was its best articu-
lated attack on administrative expertise. 2 1 With Roscoe Pound as chair of
the Committee that year, it was also the most influential. Pound's report was
as much a polemic as it was an analysis of contemporary administrative law.
Indeed, throughout the report, Pound refused to use the term "administrative
law," preferring instead to call the vision of administrative procedure advo-
cated by theorists such as Landis "administrative absolutism."'26 According
to Pound, expertise was a myth. Citing that most hated of New Deal agen-
cies, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board"), as an
example, Pound argued that the subjects of administrative inquiry were con-
tentious and political and thus not susceptible to resolution by experts.
27
More importantly, he claimed that the personnel within administrative agen-
cies were unable to protect themselves from the political currents that
flowed around them."" Indeed, many agencies were established for explic-
itly political purposes: to place a "particular subject ... under the control of
some particular group or interest."'' 29 Without the life tenure or a tradition of
122. Charles B. Stephens, To What Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies Be
Reviewable by the Courts?, 25 A.B.A. J. 543, 544 (1939).
123. McGuire, Federal Administrative Action and Judicial Review, supra note 120, at 492-93.
124. O.R. McGuire, Administrative Law and American Democracy, 25 A.B.A. J. 393, 394
(1939); see also Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Place of The Administrative Tribunal in our Legal System,
24 A.B.A. J. 267 (1938).
125. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331
(1938).
126. E.g., id. at 342-46.
127. Id. at 343-44. The report stated that "[tihe professed ideal of an independent commission
of experts above politics and reaching scientific results by scientific means, has no correspondence
with reality." Id. at 359.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 344.
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independence of the federal judiciary, administrative officials "tend to feel
that they are appointed to reach a particular end of some one class or interest
and intentionally direct their determinations accordingly."'
30
Rejecting expertise, Pound believed that, left unchecked, the inherently
political nature of the administrative process would lead to a lawless, totali-
tarian society that stripped individuals of their rights. Since an
administrative agency acted as rule maker, prosecutor, judge, and jury, pro-
ceedings before the agency were nothing more than a meaningless formality
whose purpose "from end to end is ... to give effect to a complaint."'' Of-
ten agencies skipped the hearing process altogether or made decisions based
on evidence that was not on the record. Even when they made decisions
on the record, it was filled with opinions, hearsay, and even "gossip."'33 Fur-
thermore, the record was often irrelevant because administrative officials
made decisions based on their own prejudices. 34 Adding to the arbitrary
nature of the process was the fact that agencies were not bound by the prin-
ciple of stare decisis' 35 Essentially, Pound argued that the problem with
administrative agencies was that they were not enough like courts.
Considering its diagnosis of the problems with the administrative state,
the Special Committee's recommendations were not surprising. Only by
insisting that agencies follow "the rule of law" could "the guaranteed rights
of individuals" be preserved.'3 6 Thus, the Committee called for intense judi-
cial review of agency adjudications. Courts would review both the legal
issues addressed by the agency and the sufficiency of the factual evidence. 
1
37
The Committee also suggested that Congress pass a uniform code of admin-
istrative procedure. 13 If "legalizing" the administrative process reduced the
efficiency of agency adjudications, so be it. This was the key point of the
Special Committee's Report. Administrative law had to recognize, as criminal
law did, that the societal interest in effective administration had to bow be-
fore the imperatives of personal freedom.'39
Conservatives in Congress responded positively to the Special Commit-
tee's 1938 Report, introducing legislation in April of 1939 that sought to
130. Id. at 349.
131. Id. at 351.
132. Id. at 347.
133. Id. at 348.
134. Id. at 348-49.
135. Id. at 356.
136. Id. at 342-43.
137. Id. at 361-62.
138. Id. at 362-68.
139. Id. at 357.
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implement many of its recommendations. 40 This legislation, known as the
Walter-Logan bill after its House and Senate sponsors, was debated heatedly
over the next year, until it was passed and then vetoed by President
Roosevelt. 4  Not surprisingly, Walter-Logan's proponents' arguments
closely paralleled the Special Committee's Report. Expertise, they argued,
was a myth. So called "experts" were nothing more than "theoretical zeal-
ots" who were "immoderately partisan toward the objectives they str[o]ve to
reach." 142 They were considered either starry-eyed academics with no real
world experience unfit to be "turned loose" from universities "to make over
our Government as best suits them," 41 or pawns of certain "'pressure
groups' that insisted they be placed in such positions.
' 4
Walter-Logan's supporters claimed that such partisan manipulation of
the law, without democratic accountability or recourse to the courts, was
leading towards totalitarianism. O.R. McGuire, who had reassumed his posi-
tion as chair of the Special Committee after Pound's tenure ended, argued
before the House Judiciary Committee that the bill represented a long
needed cure to the "forc[ed] ... acceptance of the Roman theory [of gov-
ernment] in which the Executive becomes supreme-a reversion to the
primitive type of government resulting in the condition obtaining in
Germany, Italy, and Russia today."'' 45 Similarly, the congressional debates
were full of statements comparing the New Deal to fascist and communist
140. Shepherd, supra note 119, at 1598-99; see also WHITE, supra note 21, at 116-21.
141. The passage of Walter-Logan does not, in and of itself, suggest that New Dealers had
abandoned the prescriptive model of policymaking. The election of 1938 was a terrible one for the
Roosevelt administration. The Democrats lost eighty-one seats in the House and eight in the Senate.
Furthermore, Roosevelt had been unable to purge the southern wing of the Democrats of candidates
he considered unreliable. See BADGER, supra note 67, at 268-70; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 76, at
271-72. Accordingly, Walter-Logan was passed by a Congress that was the least aligned with
Roosevelt and the New Deal since FDR's initial election. That said, the bill's passage indicates that
by the end of the 1930s, even some New Dealers were less sympathetic to purely prescriptive mod-
els of policymaking than they had been earlier in the decade. This was the beginning of a trend that
would accelerate in the 1940s and come to fruition in the postwar period. See Reuel E. Schiller,
Reining in the Administrative State: World War H and the Decline of Expert Administration, in To-
TAL WAR AND THE LAW 185-206 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002).
142. 86 CONG. REC. 4591 (1940) (statement of Rep. Hancock); see also id. at 4600 (statement
of Rep. Reed).
143. Id. at 4533 (statement of Rep. Cox); see also id. at 13,677 (statement of Sen. King).
144. Id. at 4544 (statement of Rep. Rees) ("Nearly all of those who have been appointed in
the last few years secured their places as political appointees."); see also id. at 4531, 4533 (state-
ment of Rep. Cox).
145. Administrative Law: Hearing on H.R. 4236, H.R. 6198, and H.R. 6324 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 33 (1939) [hereinafter House Hearings].
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governments 46 and accusations that administrative agencies were being used
to advance the totalitarian ambitions of John Lewis or Franklin Roosevelt.
47
Walter-Logan was considered a remedy to this slide into administrative
absolutism because it protected against arbitrary government action. Walter-
Logan's supporters, therefore, compared it to the Bill of Rights. 48 Like the
Special Committee, they believed that efficiency and expertise had to bow
before legal mechanisms that they claimed protected individual liberties. By
forcing administrative agencies into traditional "legal" molds-separation of
powers, judicial review, rules of evidence, mandatory cross-examination-
the bill would promote fairness and eliminate arbitrary action. '49 This, in
turn, would protect the citizens from abusive agencies. "There must be ade-
quate checks upon administrative action," Senator William King claimed, "if
liberty is to survive."5 If these checks made the administrative process
more inefficient, so be it. "A noted sage once observed that democracy is
like an old scow," Congressman Everett Dirksen noted on the final day of
the House debate:
It does not move very fast nor very far at one time, but it never sinks. I pre-
fer these attributes of an old scow with the security which it tends to give
to democratic processes as against the totalitarian superfluous liners of the
Old World with an impetuous captain giving orders for full speed ahead,
no matter what happens.
5
D. Courts, Democracy, and Expertise
To New Dealers, the idea that courts, of all institutions, could be ex-
pected to protect and promote democratic interests was laughable. To the
contrary, the Supreme Court's embrace of substantive due process and its
restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause indicated a profound judicial
hostility towards democracy. New Dealers and their allies believed that the
Court was acting as a super-legislature, striking down legislation according
to its own political interests and biases. Judicial review had become nothing
more than the judiciary's defense of existing property rights and economic
146. Consider Congressman Hawks' comparison of the SEC to the Gestapo, 86 CONG. REC.
4603 (1940), or Congressman Sumners's statement about the lack of judicial review in Germany and
Italy, id. at 13,811.
147. Id. at 4668 (statement of Rep. White).
148. Id. at 4735 (statement of Rep. Dirksen); id. at 4601 (statement of Rep. Blackney).
149. See, e.g., id. at 13,665 (statement of Sen. King); id. at 4650 (statement of Rep. Martin).
150. Id. at 13,676 (statement of Sen. King).
151. Id. at 4736 (statement of Rep. Dirksen); see also id. at 4535 (statement of Rep.
Michener) ("We have had too much speed and too little consideration in legislative matters in recent
years.").
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power: "thinly veiled propaganda of particular social interests," in the words
of political scientist Charles Merriam." 2 Edward Corwin, another political
scientist and New Deal supporter, was even more explicit. The Due Process
Clause, he wrote, "comprises nothing more or less than a roving commis-
sion to judges to sink whatever legislative craft may appear to them to be,
from the standpoint of vested interests, of a piratical tendency."' 53 "The
Court," he wrote in 1934, "had gradually made itself morally answerable for
the safety and welfare of the nation to an extent utterly without parallel in
judicial annals, past or present."'
4
Courts were thus amassing power to themselves. According to Louis
Boudin, America had been overcome by "Judicial Despotism" in which "all
powers [had been] lodged in an irresponsible judiciary."'' 55 The goal of the
despot was to preserve the outdated concept of free market capitalism that
the New Deal-era intellectual consensus had declared obsolete. "The Con-
stitution," wrote Rex Tugwell, "is used as a holy of holies within which the




Against this background of hostility towards the judiciary, it is not sur-
prising that New Dealers viewed increased judicial involvement in the
administrative process to be as bad as judicial second-guessing of legisla-
tures. James Landis tartly condemned the ABA's calls for more judicial
supervision of the administrative process as "ringing speeches against the
rise of arbitrary power for the postprandial delight of bar association audi-
ences" that would cripple the administrative state "leaving broken and
bleeding the processes of administrative law."' 57
Stalwart New Dealers in Congress agreed. In opposing the Walter-Logan
bill, Representative Adolph Sabath saw such legislation as just another
152. Herman Belz, The Realist Critique of Constitutionalism in the Era of Reform, 15 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 288, 301 (1971) (quoting CHARLES E. MERRIAM, NEW ASPECTS OF POLITICS 53-54
(1925)). For other examples of contemporary hostility towards the judiciary, see EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
(Archon Books 1970) (1934); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d
ed. 1962); and BENJAMIN R. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME
TO THE SUPREME COURT (Russell & Russell 1962) (1942).
153. Edward S. Corwin, Book Review, 6 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 270, 271 (1912) (reviewing
FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1911)).
154. CORWIN, supra note 152, at 182.
155. Belz, supra note 152, at 303 (quoting Louis B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY,
at v (1932)).
156. Herman Belz, Changing Conceptions of Constitutionalism in the Era of World War 11
and the Cold War, 59 J. AM. HisT. 640, 648 (1972) (quoting Rexford G. Tugwell, Design for Gov-
ernment, 48 POL. ScI. Q. 321, 322-23 (1933)).
157. James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law: The Walter-Logan Bill, 53
HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1102 (1940).
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means of promoting judicial interference with the New Deal on behalf of
vested interests:
The corporation lawyers who drafted this bill are closer to and they know
the judges better than they know some of these gentlemen who have
charge of the various bureaus or departments, and that is the reason they
want to get the thing into the hands of the judges, to whom they can more
easily appeal, and with whom they associate, and in whom they have great
confidence that they will protect the rights of property in the United
States.'58
Representative John Rankin was even less politic, accusing the bill's sup-
porters of wanting to establish a "judicial fascisti"'5 9 and reminding his
colleagues that "Jefferson ... said that if this Government was ever de-





Others in Congress and the Roosevelt administration were more temper-
ate, but their point was essentially the same: giving courts too much control
over the administrative process would undermine agency efficiency and ex-
pertise for the benefit of the interest groups that opposed the New Deal.
Representative Emanuel Celler disliked the idea of substituting "a court
opinion for the well-considered opinion of the head of a bureau or agency
who is better qualified by far to pass upon the circumstances than Federal
judges with all their other multifarious duties."'' 6' President Roosevelt him-
self stated that government functioned best with "informed and expert"
administration unhindered by needless legal formalities. 6' Those who
wished to hamper administrative tribunals with increased judicial oversight,
he wrote, were simply "a combination of lawyers who desire to have all
processes of government conducted through lawsuits and of interests which
desire to escape regulation."'
6 3
158. 86 CONG. REC. 4669 (1940) (statement of Rep. Sabath).
159. Id. at 4530 (statement of Rep. Rankin).
160. Id. at 4652 (statement of Rep. Rankin); see also id. at 13,719 (statement of
Sen. Barkley).
161. Id. at 4546 (statement of Rep. Celler). For other statements in opposition to legislation
that would have increased the intensity of judicial review of administrative action, see id. at 13,720
(statement of Rep. Barkley); id. at 4652 (statement of Rep. Celler); id. at 4654 (statement of Rep.
Edelstein); and id. at 4600 (statement of Rep. Ford). See also id. at 4595, 4652 (statement of Rep.
Rankin).
162. 86 CONG. REC. 13,942 (1940) (veto message of President Franklin D. Roosevelt), re-
printed in 27 A.B.A. J. 52 (1941) [hereinafter Roosevelt Veto Message].
163. Id. at 53. The Roosevelt administration mobilized a host of administrators to testify to
the pernicious effects of increasing judicial review of administrative action. See House Hearings,
supra note 145, at 109 (testimony of Norman S. Case, Acting Chairman of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission); id. at 68-69 (testimony of Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior); id. at 64-68
(memorandum of W.T. Kelley, Chief Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission); id. at 112 (testi-
mony of Clyde L. Seavey, Acting Chairman of the Federal Power Commission). Both the National
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Supporters of the New Deal did not, however, stop their defense of
agency autonomy with the assertion that the judiciary had proved itself a
particularly inappropriate entity institution to protect democratic values in
America. Their argument was not that the administrative state was simply
the more representative of two basically undemocratic institutions. To the
contrary, they bristled at assertions that administrative planning and pre-
scriptive government were somehow antithetical to democracy. Many
believed, in fact, that the opposite was true. As Berle and Means asserted in
The Modem Corporation, the idea of a supportive relationship between de-
mocracy and unregulated capitalism as it functioned in the 1930s was
nothing more than a myth. Modem capitalism, they argued, resembled an
oligarchy, not a democracy. 64 It was "great industries," not the administra-
tive state, wrote Tugwell, "that [were] making robots of us all.' ' 65 Tugwell
and Landis both viewed the New Deal as a democratic response to this de-
humanizing oligarchy.'6 Because of the New Deal's potency as a political
and social movement, the executive branch would necessarily respond to the
will of the people, who would be constantly monitoring its behavior.
6 7
Thus, it was expert administration that allowed democracy to function
properly. According to Roosevelt, only administrative agencies could ensure
"equality before the law" in the ongoing conflict "between a powerful and
concentrated interest on one side and a diversified mass of individuals, each
of whose separate interests may be small, on the other side.' 61 Two of
Roosevelt's most able acolytes, Frankfurter and Landis, elaborated. Accord-
ing to Frankfurter, the administrative state was needed to promote equality,
the sine qua non of a democratic state. It was also needed to digest, explain
and clarify the complex issues that were consistently emerging in an indus-
trialized, technological society: "In a democracy, politics is a process of
popular education-the task of adjusting the conflicting interests of diverse
groups in the community, and bending the hostility and suspicion and igno-
Lawyers' Guild and, more surprisingly, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York testified
against legislation that would have increased judicial oversight of the administrative process. Id. at
56-57, 119-27. The Guild's Committee on Administrative Law reported (presumably without a hint
of sarcasm) that "[tihe Justices of the Supreme Court would undoubtedly be the first to deny that
they have knowledge or experience sufficient to this task" of "contend[ing] with the myriad and
constantly changing procedural needs of administration." Id. at 122-23. Liberal opinion magazines
also argued against increased judicial oversight of the administrative process, citing the importance
of expertise and the malign motives of those who sought the assistance of courts. See, e.g., The Anti-
Bureaucrats, 102 NEW REPUBLIC 492 (1940); More Check Than Balance, 150 NATION 528 (1940).
164. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 85, at 46; see also Tsuk, supra note 85, at 187-90.
165. TUGWELL, supra note 78, at 38.
166. LANDIS, supra note 84, at 7-9; TUGWELL, supra note 78, at 195-96.
167. T GWELL, supra note 78, at 47, 195-205, 287.
168. Roosevelt Veto Message, supra note 162.
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rance engendered by group interests toward a comprehension of mutual un-
derstanding. For these ends, expertise is indispensable."'
69
Landis concurred with his mentor. The administrative state, he wrote,
was an institutional embodiment of democracy in action. As American soci-
ety became more inclusive and egalitarian--exemplified by Jacksonian
Democracy and the expansion of suffrage-the "governing classes" recog-
nized "their growing dependence upon the promotion of the welfare of the
governed."'' 70 In a democratic society, the people demanded "intervention"
by the government to correct the private abuses of economic power that
Landis associated with industrialization. 7'1 The resulting administrative state
met those demands.
In addition to growing up from democratic roots, agencies protected
democracy from courts and corporations."' Agencies acting on behalf of
individuals (employees or investors, for example), served as a counterweight
to the incredible power wielded by large corporations. Similarly, agencies
allowed people to avoid courts, entities that were at best inexpert bumblers
and at worst revanchist defenders of the status quo that sought to "thwart the
effects of ... legislative judgments.'7 3 The administrative state acted as an
antidote to the inegalitarian assumptions of the system of common law ad-
judication; a system premised on the demonstrably false notion that all
parties in society-be they garment workers or John D. Rockefeller-had
the same resources to commence and pursue cases in court. The administra-
tive state equalized the playing field by placing the government on the side
of the people rather than having it simply act as a neutral "umpire" in a dis-
pute between two unequal parties.
74
III. NEW DEAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This debate between the Roosevelt administration and its opponents as
to the legitimacy of an administrative state had a number of concrete
doctrinal analogues. Any doctrine that gave more power to courts to review
administrative agency actions undermined expertise and prescriptive gov-
ernment. Doctrines that increased administrative independence did the
opposite. As the 1930s passed into the 1940s and Roosevelt appointees
came to dominate the federal judiciary, courts changed the law to insulate
the administrative process from judicial oversight.
169. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT, supra note 93, at 161.
170. LANDIS, supra note 84, at 8.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 33-35.
173. Id. at 123.
174. Id. at 35-40.
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A. Judicial Review ofAgency Action
This change was particularly marked in the doctrines that governed judi-
cial review of administrative decisions. Indeed, the fate of the Ben Avon
doctrine of de novo review of rate-making is an excellent example.'75 Pro-
gressives on the Court, most notably Justice Brandeis, had attacked the Ben
Avon doctrine from its beginning. Brandeis argued in his dissent in Ben
Avon that the judiciary's role in reviewing an agency's factual finding was to
do nothing more than determine "whether there was substantial evidence to
support the finding of value."16 Such an inquiry did not permit weighing
conflicting evidence or the substitution of a court's judgment for that of the
agency. For Brandeis, this allocation of power between courts and agencies
was justified by expertise and efficiency. As he wrote, sixteen years later in
another rate-making case, the Supreme Court had to recognize "that there is
a limit to the capacity of judges.' Requiring completely independent re-
view of administrative findings of fact had undermined rate-regulation by
creating "lawsuits so protracted as to frustrate" the process. Furthermore,
independent review distributed governmental functions so improperly that
the ability of both courts and agencies was impeded:
[T]he Court must consider the effect of our decisions ... upon the admin-
istrative and judicial tribunals themselves. Responsibility is the great
developer of men. May it not tend to emasculate or demoralize the rate-
making body if ultimate responsibility is transferred to others? To the ca-
pacity of men there is a limit. May it not impair the quality of the work of
the courts if this heavy task of reviewing questions of fact is assumed?,
79
While Brandeis called for a more deferential review than did the Ben
Avon majority, judicial review under the "substantial evidence" standard he
articulated in the Ben Avon dissent was hardly without teeth. 80 Brandeis had
no problem authoring an opinion overturning the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion gas proration orders"" or joining Justice Butler's opinion upholding a
175. This discussion of the fate of Ben Avon owes much to Barry Cushman's excellent discus-
sion of rate-making. See generally Cushman, supra note 48, at 908-17.
176. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 297 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
177. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 81 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring).
178. Id. at 88.
179. Id. at 92.
180. Cf Cushman, supra note 48, at 911-13 (discussing courts' invalidation of "confiscatory"
rate regulations for violating due process).
181. Thompson v. Consol. Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
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Department of Agriculture rate-making, 182desite the fact that both opinions
were quite long on facts and technical details.
Rather, it was Brandeis's New Deal protfgfs, Felix Frankfurter in par-
ticular, who essentially stripped courts of their power to review rate-
makings. By the time Roosevelt had appointed a majority of the Justices of
the Supreme Court, not only was the Ben Avon doctrine dead, even Justice
Brandeis's substantial evidence standard had been discarded in the interest
of protecting administrative expertise from judicial meddling.
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co. exemplifies
this desire to shield agencies from judicial oversight. 8 4 In 1938, the Texas
Railroad Commission placed drastic limitations on the amount of oil pro-
ducers could pump, presumably to preserve oil resources and support oil
prices. The oil producers challenged the proration, arguing that the limita-
tions it put on the use of their property violated the Due Process Clause.
8
1
Both the district court and the circuit court enjoined the proration.8 6 In a
terse opinion, authored by Justice Frankfurter, the Court reversed the courts
below and reinstated the Commission's order. Expertise and the desires of
the people of Texas to put these decisions in the hands of an administrative
agency warranted a "fresh reminder that courts must not substitute their no-
tions of expediency and fairness for those which have guided the
agencies.' 87 Courts, Frankfurter reasoned, were simply not the right institu-
tion to be making such detailed policy decisions:
Certainly in a domain of knowledge still shifting and growing, and in a
field where judgment is therefore necessarily beset by the necessity of in-
ferences bordering on conjecture even for those learned in the art, it would
be presumptuous for courts, on the basis of conflicting expert testimony, to
deem the view of the administrative tribunal, acting under legislative au-
thority, offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment.'
When the case returned to the Court a year later, Frankfurter was even
more forthright in his commitment to expertise:
182. Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470 (1938).
183. Id. at 472-81 (valuation of the property of stockyards); Thompson, 300 U.S. at 59-61,
70-73 (natural gas production).
184. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co. (Rowan 1) 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
185. Id. at 578.
186. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 107 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1939); Rowan
& Nichols Oil Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 28 F. Supp. 131 (D. Tex. 1939).
187. Rowan 1, 310 U.S. at 581.
188. Id. at 581-82.
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We rejected these arguments as an attempt to substitute a judicial judgment
for the expert process invented by the state in a field so peculiarly depend-
ent on specialized judgment....
... Nothing in the Constitution warrants a rejection of these expert
conclusions. Nor, on the basis of intrinsic skills and equipment, are the
federal courts qualified to set their independent judgment on such matters
against that of the chosen state authorities.' 9
Accordingly, Frankfurter stated a new rule defining the relationship between
courts and the administrative state: "[i]t is not for the federal courts to sup-
plant the Commission's judgment even in the face of convincing proof that a
different result would have been better."' 90 Whatever the judicial role was to
be in the administrative processes, it was to be markedly diminished as
compared to the role laid out not only in the Ben Avon case, but even as
compared to the role envisioned by a Progressive like Brandeis.''
This shift away from detailed review of rate-making was intimately re-
lated to the decline of substantive due process. There existed what Barry
Cushman has called a "doctrinal synergy" between the decline of substan-
tive due process and the rise of judicial deference to administrative action. 9'
By the early 1940s, Roosevelt's judicial appointees had destroyed substan-
tive due process. Mere rationality in rate-making was all that the
Constitution required, and even this standard was treated so laxly as to ren-
der constitutional review a formality. 93 Judicial review of agency rate-
making, therefore, became a means in search of an end. What was the point
of spending judicial energy reviewing a rate-making if its constitutionality
was a forgone conclusion?
Nevertheless, the rise of judicial deference to administrative findings oc-
curred in nonconstitutional contexts as well. The decline of substantive due
process might explain the emergence of new judicial attitudes in cases with
constitutional implications. It does not, however, explain why courts became
189. R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co. (Rowan 11), 311 U.S. 570, 573, 575
(1941).
190. Rowan 1, 310 U.S. at 584.
191. Indeed, in his dissent in Rowan I, Justice Roberts explicitly called upon the Court to
return to the principles that Brandeis laid out in Thompson. Rowan 1, 310 U.S. at 585 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
192. See Barry Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies and Liberal Dilemmas: The Case of the Yellow
Dog Contract, 1992 SuP. CT. REV. 235 (1992).
193. A leading modem casebook on regulation describes judicial review of rate-making after
Hope Natural Gas as standing for two propositions: "First the judiciary will not embroil itself in
assessing valuation methodology as long as the 'end result' of the ratemaking process is reasonable.
Second, and related, the judiciary will largely defer to the regulator, rather than set rates itself."
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMIAN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
121 (3d. ed. 2003); see also, Richard A. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the
Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEo. L.J. 2031, 2046 (1989).
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increasingly deferential in their review of a wide variety of cases that raised
no constitutional law issues, such as cases involving the Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC").
As previously noted, during the 1910s and 1920s the federal judiciary
had reduced the FTC to little more than agency of clerks-assistants to the
federal courts that ultimately heard the merits of the cases brought under the
Federal Trade Commission Act.9 4 During the 1930s and 1940s, the Supreme
Court became considerably more deferential to the agency. The Court cited
the FTC's expertise as a justification for deferring not only to its factual
findings, but also to its interpretation of its own powers under the Act. The
Court began to admonish lower courts for their tendency to "honor[] ...
with lip service only" the Act's mandate that agency findings of fact were to
be conclusive. 95 As Justice Cardozo wrote in FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co.,
decided in early 1934: "If [testimony before the agency] may be ignored in
the face of the findings of the Commission, it can only be by turning the
court into an administrative body which is to try the case anew."' 96 Indeed,
courts were to defer not simply to the Commission's factual findings, but
also to the inferences that experts might draw from those findings. "The
Commission," wrote Justice Douglas in Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC in 1946, "is
entitled not only to appraise the facts of the particular case and the dangers
of the marketing methods employed but to draw from its generalized experi-
ence. Its expert opinion is entitled to great weight in the reviewing courts. ' 197
Even more remarkable was the Court's insistence that the judiciary
should defer to the Commission's determination of legal issues such as the
definition of unfair trade practices or the availability of certain remedies
under the Act. 198 Indeed, by the end of the 1940s, the Court viewed deferring
on these types of issues as an unremarkable and self-evident principle of
administrative law:
In [upholding a particular unfair trade practice] we give great weight to the
Commission's conclusion, as this Court has done in other cases .... [Tihe
Court [has] called attention to the express intention of Congress to create
an agency whose membership would at all times be experienced, so that its
conclusions would be the result of an expertness coming from experi-
ence.... The kind of specialized knowledge Congress wanted its agency
to have was an expertness that would fit it to stop at the threshold every un-
fair trade practice .... 9
194. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
195. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 73 (1934).
196. Id. at 77.
197. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 614 (1946) (citations omitted).
198. Id. at 612; FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934); Algoma, 291 U.S. at 81.
199. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 720 (1948) (citations omitted).
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In this one passage, written by Justice Black in 1948, the Court nicely sum-
marized the triumph of the prescriptive critique of the pre-New Deal
judiciary's relationship to the administrative state. By deferring to agencies,
courts were recognizing their own lack of expertise and taking their proper
role with respect to the democratic will of the people as expressed by Con-
gress.
Indeed, by the end of the 1930s, the courts had assumed this deferential
posture with respect to all agencies, particularly the new ones that were the
product of the New Deal itself. The chaos of pre-New Deal administrative law
was replaced by a uniform doctrine that dictated extreme deference to admin-
istrative actors. By the end of the 1930s the Supreme Court seemed to be
using what could be called a "one-sided substantial evidence test." The Court
would simply see if there was substantial evidence supporting the agency's
decision without even looking at the evidence or conflicting testimony on the
other side that might refute some of the agency's evidence. For example, the
Court upheld agency actions despite the existence of significant evidence in-
dicating that the agency's decision was incorrect in NLRB v. Waterman
Steamship Corp.," NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass, ' 20' and Swayne & Hoyt
Ltd. v. United States.20 2 The Court held in Waterman that even though most
relevant issues were not "uncontradicted and undenied" by opposing evi-
dence, these contradictions were irrelevant. °' They did not enter the
substantial evidence equation. "Even though, as appellants seem to argue, the
evidence may lend itself to support a different inference, we are without au-
thority to substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary .... 204 Similarly,
in Bradford Dyeing, the Court held that the substantial evidence inquiry did
not permit the Court to judge an agency's inferences. It could only ensure that
the "underlying findings" were supported by substantial evidence. 205
In some instances, the Court seemed to refrain from applying even this
diluted standard of review. The 1941 case Gray v. Powell2°6 is an excellent
example of this phenomenon. Gray involved a challenge to the National
Bituminous Coal Commission's ("NBCC") decision that the Seaboard Rail-
way Company was not a producer-consumer of coal but merely a207
consumer. Because producer-consumers were not subject to the price-
200. 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
201. 310 U.S. 318 (1940).
202. 300 U.S. 297 (1937).
203. Waterman, 309 U.S. at 226.
204. Swayne & Hoyt, 300 U.S. at 307.
205. Bradford Dyeing, 3 10 U.S. at 343 n.9.
206. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
207. Gray, 314 U.S. at 403-06.
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fixing and tax provisions of the Bituminous Coal Act, Seaboard stood to
lose a considerable amount of money because of the NBCC's decision.0 8
The Court upheld the Commission's decision and seemed to retreat from the
lax substantial evidence standard:
[T]he function of review placed upon the courts ... is fully performed
when they determine that there has been.., an application of the statute in
a just and reasoned manner....
... Unless we can say that a set of circumstances deemed by the
Commission to bring [Seaboard] within the concept [of] "producer" is so
unrelated to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commission as in effect
to deny a sensible exercise of judgment, it is the Court's duty to leave the
Commission's judgment undisturbed. 209
Mere reasonability, not substantial evidence, was all that the Court required.
Its justification of this standard was based on efficiency and expertise:
Congress ... found it more efficient to delegate [the determination] to
those whose experience in a particular field gave promise of a better in-
formed, more equitable, adjustment of the conflicting interests ....
... [This determination] calls for the expert, experienced judgment of
210those familiar with the industry.
The Court toed a similarly deferential line in NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc.,2 1 ' decided in 1944. Hearst involved the question of whether the
"newsboys" who hawked Hearst newspapers on the streets of Los Angeles
should be considered employees for the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NRLA" or "the Act"). 212 The Board said yes, thereby forcing
Hearst to bargain collectively with them. Once again the Court established a
profoundly deferential standard. If the Board's decision had a "'warrant in
the record' and a reasonable basis in law," then the Court was required to
uphold the Board's decision .2 Thus, substantial evidence had become mereevidence alone-whether "the evidence establishes the material facts."2 4
208. Id. at403 n.1.
209. Id. at 411,413.
210. Id. at 411-13.
211. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
212. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. at 113-15.
213. Id. at 131.
214. Id. at 130.
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The Court's decisions in Gray and Hearst also showed an inclination to
defer to agency decisions that went beyond simple factual findings. In each
case, the Court deferred to agency determinations that certain factual find-
ings fit within particular legal standards-what administrative law scholars
call "'mixed questions' of law and fact."215 In Gray, there was no dispute
that Seaboard obtained its coal from independent contractors who leased
land and equipment from Seaboard.! 6 Instead the issue was whether, as a
matter of law, this type of arrangement made Seaboard a producer or not.
21 7
Similarly, it was not disputed in Hearst that the "newsboys" worked on
commission.2 8 The question was whether this type of employment relation-
ship made newsboys employees for the purposes of the NLRA 2 9 In each
case the dissent argued that these were legal issues that were perfectly ame-
nable to resolution by courts, which were more competent than
administrative agencies in determining legislative intent.22 The majority's
response to this was quintessentially prescriptive. If the relationship between
the legal standard and the facts at issue in the case could be determined
through the use of expertise, then it should be. The majority in Hearst stated
this position explicitly:
Everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives [the Board]
familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment rela-
tionships in various industries .... The experience thus acquired must be
brought frequently to bear on the question who is an employee under the
Act. Resolving that question, like determining whether unfair labor prac-
tices have been committed, 'belongs to the usual administrative routine' of
the Board.'
Most remarkable was the inclination of some New Deal-era courts to
defer to these agency applications of fact to law, even when the law at issue
was constitutional in nature. In the late 1930s, substantive due process might
have been losing its potency, but free speech rights under the First Amend-
12ment were gradually becoming the subject of judicial protection. Yet a
215. 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.01, at 189 (1958).
216. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S 402,407 (1941).
217. Id. at 403.
218. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. at 115-18.
219. Id. at 120.
220. Id. at 130 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("The question who is an employee ... is a question
of the meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative question."); see also
Gray, 314 U.S. at 417-18 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (arguing that there are limits to the extent admin-
istrative officers may determine legislative intent).
221. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. at 130 (quoting Gray, 314 U.S. at 411).
222. 2 MELVIN 1. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 719-25 (2d ed. 2002); Schiller, supra note 38, 51-74.
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number of circuit courts thought it appropriate to defer to agency decisions
that circumscribed free speech rights .1 3 This practice was most apparent in
the way the circuit courts treated the NLRB's decisions punishing employ-
ers for statements they made during union representation elections.
Throughout the late 1930s the Board held most speech by an employer that
was aimed at dissuading workers from joining a union to be an unfair labor
practice, regardless of how temperate that speech was. The Board required
employers to remain "strictly neutral" when a union attempted to organize
224their plant. The Board rejected any claims that this doctrine of "strict neu-
225
trality" violated the free speech rights of employers.
Though this doctrine aroused considerable controversy at the time, the
216circuit courts generally enforced the Board's orders. In NLRB v. Federbush
Co.,127 the Second Circuit enforced an NLRB finding that the owner of the
Federbush Company had committed an unfair labor practice by asking an
employee "why he was turning against the firm by joining the union," which
was "just a bunch of racketeers ... trying to collect dues. 228 Writing for the
panel, Learned Hand held against the employer. The opinion embraced the
tenets of the New Deal-era, expert-based conception of policymaking. "The
privilege of 'free speech,'" Hand wrote, "is not absolute; ... a democratic
society ... cannot indeed live without it; but it is an interest measured by its
purpose., 2 9 To the extent that the employer's speech coerced workers and
interfered with their ability to arrive at an informed judgment, it was not
230protected by the First Amendment. More importantly, it was the experts at
the NLRB, not the courts, who were best equipped to determine whether a
particular instance of employer speech was coercive:
223. In addition to the NLRB cases that I recount in this and the next paragraph, courts
showed great deference to speech-related administrative determinations of the FCC. Schiller, supra
note 38, at 96-101.
224. See HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-
HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 174-78 (1950).
225. Cf Charles C. Killingsworth, Employer Freedom of Speech and the NLRB, 1941 Wis. L.
REV. 211,214-15 (discussing the Board's defense of this policy).
226. The various Board decisions and their reception in the Circuit Courts are nicely summa-
rized in contemporary literature. See id.; Recent Cases, 54 HARv. L. REV. 330, 344 (1940); Recent
Decisions, 18 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 574, 581 (1941). The Sixth Circuit was not as deferential as the
other circuits. See NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940). By the end of 1941, the
Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit's approach. NLRB v. Va. Power & Elec., 314 U.S. 469
(1941).
227. 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
228. Federbush, 121 F.2d at 955.
229. Id. at 957.
230. Id.
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Arguments by an employer directed to his employees have ... ambivalent
character; they are legitimate enough as such, and pro tanto the privilege of
"free speech" protects them; but .. . they have a force independent of per-
suasion. The Board is vested with power to measure these two factors
against each other, a power whose exercise does not trench upon the First
Amendment. 3
Thus, Hand stayed within the role that courts had been assigned by
New Deal-era legal theorists. He left any say over whether the First
Amendment was violated or not to the experts at the NLRB.
B. The Fate of Crowell v. Benson
The fate of Crowell v. Benson amidst these odes to expert administration
is surprisingly unclear. At no point was the case overruled with triumphant
references to the expertise of agencies. Yet the parade of horribles that
Dickinson and like-minded reformers feared never came to pass. Instead, the
federal courts treated Crowell as if it had never been decided, leading one
commentator to title a 1940 article about jurisdictional facts What Has Hap-
pened to Crowell v. Benson?232 Indeed, even with respect to the specific
statute it purported to interpret, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, the decision became a nullity as the Supreme Court nar-
rowed the definition of what a jurisdictional fact was under the Act out of
213
existence.
More importantly, from the perspective of the proponents of prescriptive
government, Crowell never extended its tentacles into the administrative
regimes they cared the most about-those created during the New Deal.
This was not for lack of trying. During the 1930s, litigants whose interests
were opposed to those of an agency cited Crowell as a justification for in-
tense judicial review or to call into question the constitutionality of the
statute creating the agency. The National Labor Relations Act was the most
frequent, though not the only, target of this sort of attack.114 Initially, liti-
gants argued that the Act's failure to provide for de novo judicial review of
jurisdictional facts was an infirmity that rendered the statute unconstitu-
tional. Having failed with this argument (apparently the Court found the
231. Id.
232. Robert 0. Klausmayer, "Jurisdictional Fact" Theory: What Has Happened to Crowell v.
Benson?, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1940).
233. See GELLHORN, supra note 68, at 944 n.9-
234. For cases not involving the NLRB, see Brief for the Respondents at 47, Fed. Power
Comm'n v. Pac. Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939) (No. 508), 1939 WL 48653, and Brief for
Appellants at 272, Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (No. 581), 1938 WL 39110.
235. Brief for Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. at 23, 31, 36, 102-03, NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (No. 419).
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216argument to be so meritless that it did not even address it in its opinion),
litigants tried to deploy Crowell to require more stringent review of the
Board's orders and to foreclose assertions that certain Board decisions were
unreviewable. As with the constitutional challenge, the Court rejected
these arguments by simply ignoring them. In two cases the Court did not
even bother to cite Crowell. 21 In a third, it relegated it to a footnote and
bluntly distinguished it. 39
Thus, by the early 1940s, judicial review of administrative action had
coalesced into a single doctrine. What was once a confusing and incoherent
area of the law had been simplified through the application of a cardinal
principal of prescriptive administrative law: courts were to defer to adminis-
trative agencies. Prescriptive notions of public policy dictated that agencies
must be free to apply their expertise to the issues before them without offi-
cious intermeddling by the judiciary. By the early 1940s, this dictate had
become law.m Indeed, by the end of 1941, Roosevelt had appointed seven
out of the nine members of the United States Supreme Court, as well as
241two-thirds of the judges sitting on the Federal Courts of Appeals, many of
whom had worked at the highest levels of various federal administrative
242agencies prior to their appointments. By implementing doctrines that
236. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1.
237. Brief for Appellants at 27, Am. Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940) (No. 70)
(accidentally referring to the case as Cowell v. Benson); Respondent's Brief at 27, 44, Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (No. 181); Brief for Respondent at 53, 64-68,
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (No. 706).
238. Am. Fed'n of Labor, 308 U.S. 401; Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333.
239. Myers, 303 U.S. at 50-52,51 n.8.
240. Though they are outside the scope of this Article, New Deal-era courts tinkered with
several other doctrines in a manner that insulated agencies from judicial oversight. For example, the
Supreme Court used administrative expertise as a justification for an increasingly narrow conception
of who had standing to challenge administrative action. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
113 (1940); Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118 (1939). Similarly, the Court
used the doctrine of implied preclusion to prevent judicial review of certain agency actions alto-
gether. See Switchmen's Union of N. Am. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943); Am. Fed'n
of Labor, 308 U.S. 401. Finally, while the New Deal-era Supreme Court hardly pioneered a reading
of the Due Process Clause that drew a distinction between common law rights, which triggered due
process protection, and statutory privileges, which did not, it was not adverse to using the rights-
privileges distinction to insulate administrative action from judicial review. See Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). Nor did the Court shrink from a narrow reading of the protections
provided by the Clause when it was triggered. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 431-43
(1944); Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 593-601 (1931).
241. By the end of his third term in 1941, Roosevelt had appointed thirty-six out of the fifty-
seven judges sitting on the eleven circuit courts. 118 F.2d v-xi (1941). The identity of the president
who appointed any given judge can be easily found on the Federal Judicial Center's website:
www.fjc.gov (last visited October 9, 2007).
242. A review of the 1940-41 edition of Who's Who reveals the following circuit court ap-
pointees with previous service within the federal administrative bureaucracy: Harold Stephens was
an Associate Attorney General in the Justice Department, 21 WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 2454 (Albert
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minimized judicial involvement in the administrative process, Roosevelt's
judicial appointees furthered the goals of prescriptive government. The
"practical judgment" of agencies 43 had trumped the "sterile generalizations"
of courts. 2 Saint George had vanquished the dragon.
IV. REMOVING A REFRACTIVE LENS: SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT
NEW DEAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In January of 1944, the United States Supreme Court decided Federal
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.24' Like Ben Avon, Hope Gas
was a rate-making case. The Federal Power Commission, which set rates for
interstate natural gas sales, determined that Hope Gas's rate should be set
based on a valuation of the company's property at slightly less than $34 mil-
246 247lion. Hope Gas contended that its rate-base was $66 million. The
Commission and the company had differing opinions about "reproduction
cost new," "trended original cost," and "accrued depletion and deprecia-
tion. 248 Unlike the Court in Ben Avon, these were disputes that the post-
New Deal Supreme Court had no interest in resolving. Instead, the Court
announced a profoundly deferential standard for reviewing rate-makings:
"[T]he Commission was not bound to the use of any single formula or com-
bination of formulae in determining rates," wrote Justice Douglas for the
Court.
Its rate-making function ... involves the making of "pragmatic adjust-
ments." And when the Commission's order is challenged in the courts, the
question is whether that order "viewed in its entirety" meets the require-
ments of the Act. Under the statutory standard of "just and reasonable" it is
Nelson Marquis ed., 1940); Calvert Magruder was General Counsel for the NLRB and the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, id. at 1672; Jerome Frank was General Counsel of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration and a Commissioner on the SEC, id. at 968; Armisted
Dobie and Thomas McAllister were Special Assistants to the Attorney General, id. at 780, 1729;
Seth Thomas was the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture, id. at 2553; and William Healy was
General Counsel for the Farm Credit Administration, id. at 1209. Roosevelt's Supreme Court ap-
pointees had similar experiences serving in New Deal administrative agencies: Stanley Reed was
General Counsel of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as well as a Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, id. at 2146; William 0. Douglas was chair of the SEC, id. at 795; Frank Murphy
was briefly Attorney General, id. at 1899; and Robert Jackson served in the federal administrative
bureaucracy in a number of capacities including being both Attorney General and Solicitor General,
General Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and in various positions in the Treasury De-
partment, id. at 1371.
243. LANDIS, supra note 84, at 33.
244. FRANKFURTER, supra note 109, at 236.
245. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
246. Hope Gas, 320 U.S. at 596.
247. Id. at 597.
248. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 106:399
HeinOnline -- 106 Mich. L. Rev. 440 2007-2008
The Era of Deference
the result reached not the method employed which is controlling....
Moreover, the Commission's order does not become suspect by reason of
the fact that it is challenged. It is the product of expert judgment which
carries a presumption of validity.2 9
The Court was getting out of the business of second-guessing expert rate-
making bodies. To do so was simply not compatible with the role that New
Deal judges set for themselves; they refused to "substitute [their] opinions
for the expert judgment of the administrators to whom Congress entrusted
the decision.25 °
Hope Gas is the perfect bookend for the Ben Avon case. In 1920, federal
courts picked through the minutia of the rate-making process. What meth-
odology did the agency use? What assets should be included in calculating
the rate-base? Were the values that the agency assigned the correct ones? By
the 1940s the courts had abandoned the field, leaving agencies to set rates
essentially unhindered by judicial oversight.21' For historians studying the
administrative state, the importance of this change in judicial attitude cannot
be overstated. In the 1920s, the policy limiting the power and profits of the
public utilities was refracted by both the agency that set the rates and the
court that reviewed the rate-making. Each institution shaped the policy by
imposing its own institutional values. Agencies emphasized expertise and,
perhaps, a hostility towards the regulated, while courts emphasized legal
norms, and, perhaps, a hostility towards certain types of regulation. By the
early 1940s, one of those refractive lenses had been removed. The prescrip-
tive impulses of the administrative state were no longer checked by the
institutional prerogatives of the judiciary. The profound deference of New
252Deal-era administrative law was not to last long, but it firmly defined the
role of expertise in the administrative state and created the model of judicial
deference that would be both emulated and reacted against as administrative
law developed during the rest of the twentieth century.
249. Id. at 602 (citations omitted) (quoting Fed. Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942)).
250. Id. at615.
251. See supra note 193.
252. Courts became less deferent to agencies in the years following World War 11. See
Schiller, supra note 141; HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 213-46.
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